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Abstract
Machine learning is becoming increasingly popular in modern technology
and has been adopted in various application areas. However, researchers
have demonstrated that machine learning models are vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples in their inputs, which has given rise to a field of research known
as adversarial machine learning. Potential adversarial attacks include meth-
ods of poisoning datasets by perturbing input samples to mislead machine
learning models into producing undesirable results. While such perturba-
tions are often subtle and imperceptible from the perspective of a human,
they can greatly affect the performance of machine learning models. This
paper presents two methods of verifying the visual fidelity of image-based
datasets by using QR codes to detect perturbations in the data. In the first
method, a verification string is stored for each image in a dataset. These
verification strings can be used to determine whether or not an image in the
dataset has been perturbed. In the second method, only a single verification
string is stored and can be used to verify whether an entire dataset is intact.
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1. Introduction
The widespread popularity of Machine Learning (ML) in modern tech-
nology and its rapid advancements in recent years have paved the way for its
adoption in a variety of application areas. ML techniques empower a range of
diverse applications, including malware detection [1], self-driving cars, net-
work intrusion detection, natural language processing, behavioral analytics,
speech recognition, and so on. Nevertheless, researchers have demonstrated
that ML models are vulnerable to adversarial examples in its inputs. The
purpose of these adversarial techniques is to employ malicious inputs to fool
a ML model into producing erroneous outputs [2, 3]. Consequently, this has
given rise to a field of research known as adversarial machine learning [4].
There are a number of different adversarial attacks that can be deployed
against ML techniques, for instance, an adversary can poison a dataset by
perturbing samples in the training data [4]. Over the years, researchers
have examined and demonstrated the effectiveness of such poisoning attacks
[5, 6, 7]. Adversarial attacks are a serious threat to the success of ML in
practice, as small and subtle perturbations in its inputs can mislead a ML
model into outputting incorrect predictions, thereby negating the usefulness
of the ML model. For ML in computer vision, such perturbations made to
images in the ML dataset are often imperceptible to the human visual system
[8].
This paper focuses on methods of protecting image-based datasets by
verifying the visual fidelity of the data. The effectiveness of ML techniques
is affected by the availability of training data. In general, ML models re-
quire large amounts of training data to be effective. In light of this necessity
for significant amounts of training data, many ML models are trained using
public datasets that are freely available online. These public datasets are
often copied and distributed without any mechanism for protecting the in-
tegrity of the data. This makes these datasets vulnerable to alterations by
an adversary.
To address this problem, the research presented here investigates two
methods of verifying the visual fidelity of image-based datasets by detecting
perturbations in the data using QR codes. The advantage of the proposed
methods is that a copy of the original dataset does not have to be stored or
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used for verification. In the first method, a verification string is generated for
each image in a dataset using a QR code. The size of a verification string is
much smaller than the original image, and it can be used to verify the visual
fidelity of the image. To verify image fidelity, a verification process is used
to recover a QR code for each image. If the resulting QR code is noisy or
cannot be recovered through this verification process, this indicates that the
dataset has been altered.
However, since this method requires a verification string for each image
in a dataset, the storage requirement increases linearly with the number of
images in the dataset. While this is fine if storage space is not an issue, it may
not be an attractive solution for applications with limited storage capacity,
e.g., for mobile computing and pervasive social networking that may have
storage restrictions [9]. Therefore, a second method is proposed where only
a single verification string is required, and can be used to verify the fidelity
of images in an entire dataset. The limitation of the second method is that
if the dataset has been altered, one cannot determine which image has been
altered, only that the dataset is not intact as it is different from the original.
1.1. Contribution.
The research presented in this paper investigates the problem of pro-
tecting image-based ML datasets against alteration by an adversary. The
proposed methods, which were first presented in Chow et al. [10], attempt
to provide mechanisms for verifying the visual fidelity of images in a dataset
without the need to store and use the original dataset for this purpose. To do
this, verification strings are generated from the visually important content
of the images and these are associated with QR codes. The reason for using
QR codes for this purpose is due to its inherent data capacity and error cor-
rection properties, which are inbuilt in the QR code structure. Two methods
for creating verification strings to verify the fidelity of an image dataset are
presented. The advantage of the first method, i.e. the Linear Verification
String (LVS) method, is that the fidelity of each image can be verified in-
dividually. However, this comes at the cost of higher storage requirements.
The advantage of the second method, i.e. the Aggregate Verification String
(AVS) method, is that only a single verification string is required to deter-
mine whether an entire dataset is intact. Nevertheless, it does not allow for
one to determine the visual fidelity of individual images.
3
2. Background
The proposed methods are based on several concepts, including the QR
code structure, the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT), the Arnold trans-
form and trapdoor permutation. This section presents a background to these
concepts followed by a description of related work.
2.1. Preliminaries
2.1.1. QR Code
The Quick Response (QR) code is a two-dimensional (2D) barcode, which
was invented by the company Denso Wave [11]. Since its inception, the
QR code has seen widespread adoption in a variety of diverse application
domains, ranging from electronic payments to product advertisements, social
media, and so on. In this research, the reason for using the QR code is to
exploit its inbuilt error correction mechanism, which is an inherent part of
the QR code structure. This mechanism enables a QR code to be correctly
decoded even if part of the QR code symbol is corrupted.
A QR code is made up of light and dark modules, which are organized into
function patterns and an encoding region [12]. The size and data capacity of
a QR code is determined by its version and error correction level. There are
forty different QR code versions and four error correction levels, namely, low
(L), medium (M), quartile (Q) and high (H). These four error correction levels
correspond to error tolerances of approximately 7%, 15%, 25% and 30%,
respectively. The higher the error correction level, the greater the capacity
for data recovery. However, conversely the higher the error correction level,
the larger the amount of error correction redundancy that must be encoded
in the QR code. Hence, QR codes with higher error correction levels have
lower capacity for encoding actual data as compared with the same QR code
version with a low error correction level.
2.1.2. DWT
The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is a frequency domain trans-
form technique that is widely used in signal processing. For 2D images, it in-
volves decomposing an image into frequency channels of constant bandwidth
on a logarithmic scale [13]. An image is decomposed into four sub-bands,
which are labeled low-low (LL), low-high (LH), high-low (HL) and high-
high (HH). The sub-bands can be further decomposed at the next level,
and this process can continue until the desired number of levels is achieved.
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Figure 1: Sub-bands of a two-level DWT.
A depiction of how an image can be decomposed into two levels of DWT sub-
bands is shown in Fig. 1. The LL sub-band contains most of the information
of the original image [14]. As such, it represents the highest visual fidelity of
an image, as the human visual system is more sensitive to its contents. Data
from the LL2 sub-band was used in experiments conducted in this study.
2.1.3. Arnold transform.
Adjacent pixels in an image have strong correlation to each other. The
Arnold transform, shown in Eq. 1, is a invertible transform that can be used
to disrupt the correlation between adjacent pixels [15]. An original image
that undergoes a number of Arnold transform iterations results in a chaotic
image. The transform is invertible as the original image can be recovered
after a certain number of transform iterations are applied to the chaotic
image. The reason for using this transform in this study is because image
perturbations introduce noise to an image. Applying the Arnold transform
to an image scrambles the pixels, and thus, scatters the noise over the image.
This increases the potential of detecting perturbations made to the image














Let D be a finite set. A permutation family Π over D specifies a ran-
domized algorithm for generating (descriptions of) a permutation and its in-
verse, denoted as (s, t) R←− Generate; an evaluation algorithm Evaluate(s, ·);
and an inversion algorithm Invert(t, ·). We require that for all (s, t) pro-
duced by the algorithm Generate, Evaluate(s, ·) be a permutation of D and
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Invert(t, Evaluate(s, ·)) be the identity map. A trapdoor permutation fam-
ily is one way if it is hard to invert, given just the forward permutation
description s. Formally, a trapdoor permutation family is (t, ϵ)-one way if





x = A(s, Evaluate(s, x)) : (s, t) R←− Generate, x R←− D
]
,
where the probability is over the coin tosses of Generate and A.
2.2. Related Work
Researchers have previously proposed the use of QR codes for a num-
ber of diverse applications in information security. Examples of information
security techniques that adopt the use of QR codes, include methods for
authentication in mobile cloud computing [16], authentication for wearable
devices [17], storing private and public information [18], secret sharing [19],
visual cryptography [20], digital image watermarking [21] and so on.
The methods presented in this research are related to zero-based im-
age watermarking. Unlike traditional image watermarking techniques, which
necessitate that a watermark be embedded within an image, zero-based ap-
proaches do not require the embedding of a watermark [22]. For example,
Liu and Yan [14] proposed a secret sharing scheme based on zero-based wa-
termarking. In their approach, the watermark was not embedded within
the images, but rather cover images were used to create shares that were to
be distributed to participants, with another share that was to be registered
with a certification authority. Ownership of the images could then be verified
when information in the shares were combined with contents in the original
images.
Zero-based image watermarking schemes that adopt the use of QR codes
have also previously been proposed by the research community. As an ex-
ample, an authentication method for medical images using zero-based wa-
termarking and QR codes has been investigated. In this scheme, a patient’s
identification details and a link to their data was encoded in the form of
a QR code that served as the watermark [23]. Similarly, Li et al. [24] pro-
posed a QR code based zero watermarking scheme in conjunction with visual
cryptography for authenticating identification photos.
In addition, QR codes have previously been used in conjunction with tra-
ditional digital image watermarking. For instance, a watermarking scheme
based on the combination of discrete cosine transform, QR codes and chaotic
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theory was proposed by Kang et al. [25]. In other work, a digital rights man-
agement technique for protecting documents by repeatedly inserting a QR
code into a DWT sub-band of a document was investigated [26]. Others have
also proposed different QR code watermarking approaches, for example, an
approach that incorporates an attack detection feature to detect malicious
interference by an attacker [27], another approach that embeds QR code
watermarks using a just noticeable difference model to increase impercepti-
bility [28], and a hybrid approach that uses the discrete cosine transform in
conjunction with the discrete wavelet transform for QR code watermarking
[21].
3. Proposed Methods
The two proposed methods are described in this section. The first method
allows for the verification of each image in a dataset. It provides a mechanism
whereby a user can check whether individual images in a dataset have been
perturbed. However, the first method comes at a cost of storing a verification
string for each image. This may not be an appealing solution in situations
where storage space is an issue. As such, a second method is proposed with
very low storage requirements and provides a mechanism to verify whether an
entire dataset is intact. Nevertheless, using the second method, while a user
can determine whether or not a dataset is intact, the user cannot determine
which of the images have been perturbed in the event that the dataset has
been altered from its original version.
3.1. Method 1 - Linear Verification String (LVS) method
The notion behind this method is to generate a verification string for each
image in a dataset. Hence, it is called the Linear Verification String (LVS)
method. The purpose of a verification string is to be able to ascertain whether
an image has been altered from the original image. An advantage of gen-
erating a verification string is so that respective images in a dataset do not
have to be compared with their original image. Moreover, the verification
strings will require much less storage space when compared with the size of
an entire image dataset. This is due to the fact that the size of a verification
string, which is a bit string consisting of 0s and 1s, is much smaller than the
size of an image.
The motivation behind this approach is based on zero-based image wa-
termarking [14]. Unlike traditional watermarking techniques that requires a
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Figure 2: Overview of the process to generate a verification string for each image in a
dataset.
watermark to be embedded within an image, zero-based approaches do not
alter the image. This is in line with the objective of the proposed approach,
which is to detect whether images in a dataset have been altered. Hence, the
method itself must not change the images.
3.1.1. Generating Verification Strings.
Fig. 2 gives an overview of the process used to generate verification
strings for all images in a dataset. It can be seen from the figure that to
create the verification strings, a QR code that contains a secret message, S,
and a key, K, for encryption is required. K is a random bit string, which can
be generated in a number of different ways, for example, by using a pseudo-
random number generator or by using the hash of a password. Encryption
involves performing S ⊕ K for all modules in S. As such, the length of K
must equal the number of modules in S. For instance, a QR code version 1
which consists of 21 × 21 modules requires the key to contain 441 random
bits.
The purpose of performing encryption is so that an adversary will not be
able to obtain any information about S from the verification strings. Arnold
transform will then be performed on the encrypted secret, SE, to scramble
the pixels. The reason for doing this is to scatter any noise that may result
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from perturbations to an image over the entire image. The scrambled secret,
ST , will be used for creating the verification strings. Note from Fig. 2 that
the same ST can be used for all images, as this will avoid the necessity of
having to generate multiple QR code messages and keys.
Each image in the dataset then undergoes the same process. Each image
is decomposed into DWT components at the desired level (DWT at level 2
was used to obtain the experiment results presented in Section 4). The LL
sub-band, which represents the highest visual fidelity, will be binarized using
a dithering process. The objective of dithering is to binarize the image into
black and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s), while maintaining the average gray
level distribution. In the results presented in Section 4, the Floyd-Steinberg
dithering technique, which is an approach that is based on error diffusion
[29], was used for the experiments.
After the dithering process, each image is upsampled using nearest neigh-
bor sampling to match the size of ST . The upsampling process is the reason
why S can be of any size larger than IDWT . Finally, a verification string, Vi,
is produced for each image in the dataset by XORing ST with their respective
dithered and upsampled DWT sub-band.
For grayscale images, this process can be carried out directly. For color
images, there are two options. The first is to convert the color images into
grayscale images, prior to running the algorithm. The second is to separate
the color channels, e.g., into red, green and blue color channels, and perform
the process on each individual color channel, in which case the verification
string’s length will increase based on the number of color channels. Neverthe-
less, the advantage of the second option of generating verification strings for
each color channel allows for the method to detect alterations in individual
color channels.
Details of the algorithm to generate verification strings for all images in
a dataset is provided in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 in turn, modifies the
original verification string generation algorithm by performing the process
on separate color channels for color images. Inputs to both algorithms are a
secret QR code, S, an encryption key, K, and all images in a dataset. The
algorithm outputs a verification string for each image in the dataset.
3.1.2. Verifying Image Fidelity.
The verification strings can be used to verify the visual fidelity of images
in the dataset, and to determine whether any of the images have been per-
turbed. An overview of this process is depicted in Fig. 3. Similar to the
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for generating verification strings.
Input: A QR code, S, a key, K, and images in a dataset, Ii, where
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: Verification strings, Vi, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
Step 1. Encrypt information in S by XORing the random bits in K with
the modules in S to produce SE.
Step 2. Generate a chaotic image ST by scrambling the bits in SE using
Arnold transform for a number of iterations.
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 3. Convert Ii to IDWTi by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 4. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTi.
Step 5. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black
and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 6. Produce IDi by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match
the size of ST .
Step 7. Generate the verification string Vi using IDi ⊕ ST .
process for generating verification strings, each image in the dataset is de-
composed into DWT components. The LL sub-band at the pre-determined
level is dithered and upsampled using nearest neighbor sampling to match the
size of the verification string. Each pair of these are XORed, i.e. Vi⊕ IDi, to
produce S ′Ti. Note that if an image was perturbed, S ′Ti ̸= ST for that image.
To recover the QR code, Arnold transform is inversed and K is used for
decryption to produce a recovered QR code for each image, SRi. If no images
in the dataset were altered, the QR code can be recovered perfectly for all
images in the dataset. However, if an image was perturbed, SRi for that
image will result in a noisy QR code.
Algorithm 3 details the steps involved in verifying the fidelity of images
in a dataset. The required inputs to the algorithm are the key, K, that was
used for encryption, the verification strings and the images in the dataset.
For each image in the dataset, the algorithm outputs the recovered QR code.
The visual fidelity of each image can be determined based on whether the
resulting SRi is a clean or a noisy QR code. If SRi is noisy, a clean recon-
structed QR code can be obtained by averaging the black and white pixels
per module. If there are more white pixels, the module should be white, and
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for generating verification strings for separate color
channels.
Input: A QR code, S, a key, K, and images in a dataset, Ii, where
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: Verification strings, Vi, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
Step 1. Encrypt information in S by XORing the random bits in K with
the modules in S to produce SE.
Step 2. Generate a chaotic image ST by scrambling the bits in SE using
Arnold transform for a number of iterations.
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 3. Split Ii into its corresponding color channels, Iij, where j ∈
{r, g, b} for red, green and blue color channels.
For each image color channel, Iij, do
Step 4. Convert Iij to IDWTij by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 5. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTij.
Step 6. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black
and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 7. Produce IDij by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match
the size of ST .
Step 8. Generate components of the verification string Vij using IDij⊕ST .
Step 9. Produce the verification string Vi by appending the components
Vij for all j ∈ {r, g, b}, i.e. Vi = Vir + Vig + Vib.
11
Figure 3: Overview of the process to verify each image in a dataset.
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vice versa. If the verification strings were generated based on separate color
channels, Algorithm 4 presents steps in the process to reconstruct QR codes
for verifying the color channels of the images.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for verifying image fidelity.
Input: The key, K, verification strings, Vi, and images in a dataset, Ii,
where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: Recovered QR codes, S ′Ri, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 1. Convert Ii to IDWTi by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 2. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTi.
Step 3. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black
and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 4. Produce IDi by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match
the size of ST .
Step 5. Generate S ′Ti using Vi ⊕ IDi.
Step 6. Inverse the Arnold transform on S ′Ti to produce S ′Ei.
Step 7. Decrypt S ′Ei using K to recover the QR code, SRi.
3.2. Method 2 - Aggregate Verification String (AVS) method
The main drawback of the previously described LVS method, is its require-
ment to have to store the verification strings of all images in a dataset.
Storage requirements are proportional to the number of images in a dataset.
While the LVS method may seem impractical, it can be used to indepen-
dently identify any alteration in an individual image Ii, because the verifi-
cation string Vi must be stored. Hence, when storage space is not an issue
(such as the use of cloud storage), this method is feasible and attractive.
In the event that storage space is limited, the second method address this
issue. The aim of the second method is to reduce the required storage size to
the size of a single verification string. In addition, the use of trapdoor per-
mutation (which can be implemented using an RSA algorithm for example)
and a one way hash function, is used to provide additional layers of security.
An overview of the algorithm is depicted in Figure 4. The initial process is
similar to the LVS method. After the dithering process, IDi is obtained, which
will be XORed with the key Ki and the QR code S. Hence, IEi ← S⊕Ki⊕IDi.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm for verifying image fidelity for separate color chan-
nels.
Input: The key, K, verification strings, Vi, and images in a dataset, Ii,
where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: Recovered QR codes, S ′Ri, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 1. Split Ii into its corresponding color channels, Iij, where j ∈
{r, g, b} for red, green and blue color channels.
For each image color channel, Iij, do
Step 2. Convert Iij to IDWTij by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 3. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTij.
Step 4. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black
and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 5. Produce IDij by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match
the size of ST .
Step 6. Extract Vij from Vi.
Step 7. Generate S ′Tij using using Vij ⊕ IDij.
Step 8. Inverse the Arnold transform on S ′Tij to produce S ′Eij.
Step 9. Decrypt S ′Eij using K to recover the QR code, SRij.
14
Figure 4: Overview of the AVS method.
However, unlike the LVS method, Ki
R←− Evaluate(s, ·), where the input of
the Evaluate algorithm is obtained from the hash value of the IE(i−1), which
is the output of IEi from the previous image block. For K1 of the first image
block, an initial string such as the hash value of S or any other initial vector
can be used. With this chaining mechanism, the final output block will only
comprise of a single verification string, V , regardless the number of images
involved. The algorithm for the AVS method is provided in Algorithm 5.
Since trapdoor permutation is used in the construction, the verification
will require the use of the Invert(t, ·) algorithm, which cannot be executed
without the value of the trapdoor. Therefore, when verifying the fidelity of
images in a dataset, if the QR code cannot correctly be recovered at any
image block, this means that the image has been altered and the dataset is
not intact. On the other hand, if the QR code can be recovered in all image
blocks, the dataset is completely intact.
In summary, to highlight the differences between LVS and AVS, in the
AVS method, a constant size output is achieved regardless the number of the
image blocks. Furthermore, the security level is enhanced by incorporating a
symmetric encryption scheme in LVS with a trapdoor permutation algorithm
in AVS.
3.3. Security
The security of the AVS algorithm is outlined as follows. First of all, let’s
recap the algorithm involved.
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Algorithm 5 AVS algorithm.
Input: A QR code, S, the first key, K1, and images in a dataset, Ii, where
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Output: A verification string, V
For each image, Ii, in the dataset, do
Step 1. Convert Ii to IDWTi by performing DWT to the desired level.
Step 2. Exact the LL sub-band from IDWTi.
Step 3. Dither the pixels to binarize the extracted LL sub-band into black
and white bits (i.e. 0s and 1s).
Step 4. Produce IDi by upsampling the dithered LL sub-band to match
the size of S.
Step 5. Generate IEi using S ⊕Ki ⊕ IDi. If i ≠ 1, Ki = hash(IE(i−1)).
For the last image, In, output the verification string, V = IEn.
1. IDWTi ← DWT (Ii).
2. IDi ← Dither and Up-sample(IDWTi).
3. IEi ← S ⊕Ki ⊕ IDi, where S is obtained from the QR code, and the
key is set to be Ki.
4. Ki ← Evaluate(s,H(IE(i−1))), where (s, t) is a pair of public/private
key of the user.
Note that the Evaluate(·, ·) function is a trapdoor permutation. The se-
curity of this system relies on the difficulty of finding the inverse of this
Evaluate algorithm, and hence, the trapdoor permutation. If the trapdoor
permutation is implemented with RSA, then
Evaluate(s,H(IE(i−1))) := H(IE(i−1))
s (mod N)
for a modulus N . This means, the attacker must be able to find the Invert(t, ·)
function, which is defined as
Invert(t, z) := zt (mod N)
where st := 1 (mod ϕ(N)). Hence, as long as the RSA problem is secure,
then the above algorithm is secure. 
It can further easily be deduced that given the final verification string V
(see Fig. 4), it is infeasible to backtrack and obtain all of the other verification
16
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Example of S, SE and ST (a) QR code containing a secret message; (b) the
encrypted QR code; (c) result after Arnold transform.
parts for each image Ii without knowledge of the secret trapdoor. Hence, the
security of the scheme is ensured. 
4. Experiments and Discussion
This section presents example results obtained from experiments that test
the proposed methods. To perform the tests, experiments were conducted
by implementating the algorithms and a number of different test images
were used in conjunction with the implementations. The test programs were
implemented using the OpenCV library.
Fig. 5(a) shows an example of S, i.e. a QR code containing a secret
message. The QR code is of version 3, which contains 29× 29 modules, with
error correction level H. An example of S after encryption, i.e. SE, is shown
in Fig. 5(b). Fig. 5(c) was produced by scrambling the bits in SE using
Arnold transform to generate ST . Note that in line with Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2, the same ST was used in the experiments to obtain the results
shown in Table 1 and Table 3.
Table 1 shows examples of some test images that were used in the exper-
iments. These images are commonly used for testing image processing tech-
niques; namely, the lena, peppers and mandrill images, respectively. The
table also shows the DWT LL2 sub-band after the dithering and upsampling
processes for the respective test images, i.e. IDi. Finally, the table shows
visual depictions of the verification strings Vi for the respective test images,
which were generated as a result of IDi ⊕ ST . Note that the verification
strings are bit strings consisting of 0s and 1s, the table depicts these in a
visual form (i.e. 0s are represented using black pixels, and conversely, 1s are
represented as white pixels).
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Table 1: Example images that were produced as a result of Algorithm 1.
Image, Ii
Dithered and upsampled Visual Depiction
LL2 Sub-band, IDi of Vi
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Table 2 shows example results that were obtained when attempting to
verify the image fidelity of perturbed test images. This shows results of
Algorithm 3, when tested on images that underwent basic perturbations.
The test image was then perturbed using three common techniques; namely,
JPEG compression, noise and blurring. For JPEG compression, a value of
95% quality was used in the experiments. To test perturbations resulting
from the introduction of noise, 5 random pixels in the test images were al-
tered. For blurring, Gaussian blurring was used with σ = 0.5. These are
small perturbations that typically go unnoticed from the human visual per-
spective.
The first column in the table shows the test images that were used, while
the second column shows the type of perturbation that was performed on
the image before running the verification process. The third column in Table
2 depicts the results obtained when attempting to recover the QR code (i.e.
SRi) from the image that underwent perturbation. Note that the recovered
QR codes are all noisy, hence, this shows that the image was perturbed and
is different from the original image. It can be seen that even small changes
to the image (e.g., 5 random pixels), results in a noisy recovered QR code,
which demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach in ascertaining
whether an image in a dataset has been perturbed. The final column shows
QR codes that were reconstructed from SRi, which were obtained as a result
of cleaning up the noisy QR code by averaging the black and white pixels per
module (i.e. if there are more white pixels in the noisy QR code constituting a
module, the module is reconstructed as a white module, and vice versa). Note
that the gray modules represent modules that were incorrectly reconstructed
when compared with the original QR code, S.
Table 3 shows example images obtained from running Algorithm 2 on a
color image. The first column of the table shows the color image that was
used, and the second column shows images of the respective color channels.
Results of dithering and upsampling the DWT LL2 sub-band for each color
channel of the image is shown in the third column, and a visual depiction of
the generated verification strings is shown in the last column.
The purpose of Algorithm 4 was to verify whether a color image was
perturbed using different color channels. Example results obtained from an
experiment to test this is presented in Table 4. The previously described
perturbations were done on the color image, prior to the verification process.
The images of the different color channels can be seen in the first column of
Table 4, while the second column shows the type of perturbation that was
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Table 2: Examples resulting from Algorithm 3 on perturbed images.
Image, Ii
Type of Recovered Reconstructed










Table 3: Example images resulting from Algorithm 2, which separates the image color
channels.
Color Image, Ii
RGB Color IDij per Visual Depiction











done on the image. Columns three and four show the recovered QR code,
SRi, and reconstructed QR code, respectively. It can be seen from the results
in the third column that the recovered QR codes are all noisy as a result
of perturbations made to the image. Hence, it can be determined that the
image is not intact.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, the problem of protecting image-based machine learning
datasets against alteration by an adversary was examined. Two methods
were presented, namely, the Linear Verification String (LVS) method and the
Aggregate Verification String (AVS) method. The purpose of these methods
is to provide mechanisms for verifying the visual fidelity of images in a dataset
without the need to store and use the original dataset for verification.
In both the LVS and AVS methods, verification strings were generated
from the important visual content of the images and associated with QR
codes. In the LVS method, a verification string is generated for each image
in a dataset. For verification, a verification process is used whereby each
verification string is used to verify the visual fidelity of individual images in
the dataset. However, the drawback of the LVS method is that the storage
requirement increases linearly with the number of images in a dataset. To
overcome this problem, the AVS method was proposed. The AVS method
only requires the storage and use of a single verification string to verify
whether an entire image dataset is intact. Nonetheless, in the AVS method,
one can only ascertain whether the dataset has been altered, but cannot
determine the visual fidelity of individual images.
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